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Abstract
In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that
so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting eviden-
tial decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping
Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to
it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires
that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only
at other decision points where she has exactly the same information, but
also at decision points where she has different but “symmetric” informa-
tion.
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cision theory, Dutch books.
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Heads (1/2) Tails (1/2)
Monday awake awake
Tuesday asleep awake
Figure 1: Coin tosses and corresponding awakenings, as well as their probabili-
ties, in the Sleeping Beauty problem.
1 Introduction
The Sleeping Beauty problem (reviewed below) has attracted much attention
because it relates to a variety of unresolved philosophical problems.1 It is, in
the first place, a puzzle about beliefs. The question of what Beauty should
believe upon awakening divides philosophers and others into multiple camps,
mainly “halfers” and “thirders” (though finer distinctions can be made). But
decision theory has also been pulled into the debate. This is because one natural
strategy for adjudicating between the halfer and thirder positions is to evaluate
the effects of the candidate beliefs on Beauty’s decisions; if one position results
in clearly irrational decisions, this would appear to settle the matter. As it
turns out, the success of such arguments appears to hinge on which version of
decision theory – causal or evidential – Beauty adopts. A natural reaction is to
feel disappointment at the fact that a clean resolution to the original question
appears elusive. But it is also possible to see opportunity: perhaps variants
of the Sleeping Beauty problem actually allow us to adjudicate between causal
and evidential decision theory instead. This is the aim of this paper. Of course,
this may also help us resolve the original question, insofar as the arguments
against halfing or thirding become decisive once the debate between causal and
evidential decision theory has been settled in this context.
Let us recall the standard variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem [Elga,
2000]. Beauty is put to sleep on Sunday, and a fair coin is tossed. If it lands
Heads, she will be briefly awoken on Monday only. If it lands Tails, she will be
briefly awoken on Monday, and then again on Tuesday. The table in Figure 1
summarizes this. Whenever she is awoken, she does not remember any previous
awakenings, nor does anything in the room indicate to her what day it is. Beauty
knows all this throughout. Now let us put ourselves in the shoes of Beauty when
she has just been awoken in the experiment. What should be her credence that
the coin came up Heads? Halfers believe that the answer is 1/2; after all, the
fact that she has been awoken should not tell her anything about the possible
(uncentered) world that she is in, because the awakening event is consistent with
each of the two possible worlds. In contrast, thirders believe that the answer is
1/3; after all, only 1/3 of the possible awakening events occur in a Heads world,
and this would be borne out when repeating the experiment many times. Who
is right?
One decision-theoretic approach to answering this question is to attempt to
1Titelbaum [2013] gives a useful overview of these connections.
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Heads (1/2) Tails (1/2)
Sunday bet 1: -15 bet 1: 15
Monday bet 2: 10 bet 2: -10
Tuesday no bet bet 2: -10
total gain from accepting all bets -5 -5
Figure 2: The table shows which bet is offered when, as well as the net gain
from accepting the bet in the corresponding possible world, for Hitchcock’s
Dutch book.
construct a Dutch book to which one of the two positions is vulnerable. A Dutch
book is a set of bets that the agent in question would all accept individually, but
that together ensure that the agent incurs a strict loss overall. In a diachronic
Dutch book, the bets are offered at different times; all of the Dutch books
discussed in this paper are diachronic. Hitchcock [2004] describes a Dutch book
argument against the halfer position. In this Dutch book, the bookie first –
before Beauty goes to sleep – sells her a bet that costs 15 and pays out 30 if
the coin lands Tails.2 Then, each time that Beauty awakens, he sells her a bet
that costs 10 and pays out 20 if the coin has landed Heads. The idea is that
if Beauty is a halfer, then she will always be willing to accept these bets. (In
fact, she will be indifferent between accepting them and not accepting them; it
is straightforward to slightly modify the payoffs so that she will strictly prefer
to accept them.) Now, if the coin lands Heads, she will buy bet 1 once and bet
2 once, at a total cost of 25, and bet two will pay out 20 – so she will run a net
loss of 5. On the other hand, if the coin lands Tails, she will buy bet 1 once
and bet 2 twice, at a total cost of 35, and bet 1 will pay out 30 – so again she
will run a net loss of 5. Thus the Dutch book succeeds. The table in Figure 2
summarizes Hitchcock’s Dutch book.
However, Draper and Pust [2008] point out that this Dutch book does not
succeed against a halfer that accepts evidential decision theory, because, as Arntzenius
[2002] pointed out earlier, such an agent would calculate the expected utility
of her options differently in the Sleeping Beauty problem. Specifically, consider
the situation where Beauty accepts evidential decision theory, has just been
awoken, and is now calculating the expected value of accepting bet 2. For this
calculation, by EDT, she assumes that, if the coin has come up Tails, she also
has accepted or will accept bet 2 on the other day. Thus, in this case, accepting
bet 2 (on both days) comes at a cost of 20, and pays out nothing, for a net loss
of 20; whereas in the Heads case, accepting bet 2 (once) comes at a cost of 10
and pays out 20, for a net gain of only 10. So even if her credence in Heads is
as high as 1/2, she will not accept bet 2, and the Dutch book fails.3
2To minimize clutter, I will not specify currency units such as dollars or euros.
3Draper and Pust do propose a modified Dutch book that involves telling Beauty that it
is Monday and then offering a bet; this Dutch book works against some halfers, whether they
are causal or evidential decision theorists, but not against so-called “double-halfers” who hold
that the correct credence remains 1/2 even after Beauty is told it is Monday.
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Briggs [2010] goes further and presents a proof that thirders who accept
causal decision theory and halfers who accept evidential decision theory are
both immune to Dutch books, and not just in the original Sleeping Beauty
problem but also in variants thereof. The intuition for why these two combined
positions would be equivalent in this sense is the following. When an evidential
decision theorist calculates her utility conditional on accepting a bet (or not
accepting it) in a possible world, she assumes that she does the same upon
every other awakening, so the effect is multiplied by the number of times she
awakens in that possible world. On the other hand, for a thirder, the probability
of a possible world is multiplied by the number of times she awakens in that
possible world. This ends up having the same effect on the relevant expected
utility calculations.4
Briggs’ proof implicitly assumes that Beauty, upon an awakening, always has
the same information available to her. This rules out variants such as “Techni-
color Beauty” [Titelbaum, 2008] where Beauty, upon awakening, sees a piece of
paper whose color is not always the same. The Technicolor Beauty variant illus-
trates that irrelevant additional information, such as the paper’s color – which is
uncorrelated with the variable of interest – can change the halfer’s credence for
the variable of interest (at least under a standard interpretation of halfing – but
see Footnote 5). Indeed, Briggs does discuss Technicolor Beauty and concludes
that this instability of the halfer’s credence is a mark against halfing, but this
is only after she has completed her discussion of Dutch books. What has not
yet been appreciated, to my knowledge, is the following: if Beauty is an evi-
dential decision theorist, then in variants such as Technicolor Beauty where she
does not always have the same information available to her upon waking, she
is vulnerable to Dutch books, regardless of whether she is a halfer or a thirder.
This is what I will demonstrate in what follows. I first introduce a variant of
the Sleeping Beauty problem.
2 TheWhite-Black-Grey (WBG) Sleeping Beauty
Variant
Beauty will be awoken twice, once on Monday and once on Tuesday. As usual,
when she is awoken on Tuesday, she has no memory of the previous awakening.
The only information available to her upon awakening (besides the information
that was available to her at the start of the experiment) is the color of the room
in which she is awoken. Two distinct fair coins are tossed to determine the color
of the room in which she is awoken on each of the two days. Coin 1 has a white
side and a black side; this coin will be used to determine the color of the room
in which she is awoken on Monday. Coin 2 has a grey side and a side with the
word “opposite” written on it; this coin will be used to determine the color of
4The idea that thirding goes hand in hand with CDT, and halfing with EDT, also finds
support elsewhere, for example in the context of the absentminded driver problem [Schwarz,
2014b].
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WG (1/4) WO (1/4) BO (1/4) BG (1/4)
Monday white white black black
Tuesday grey black white grey
Figure 3: Sequences of coin tosses and corresponding room colors, as well as
their probabilities, in the WBG Sleeping Beauty variant.
the room in which she is awoken on Tuesday, where Opposite indicates that the
color of the room should be the opposite of what it was on Monday. That is,
if the first coin comes up White and the second coin comes up Opposite, then
she will be awoken in the black room on Tuesday, and vice versa. The table
in Figure 3 shows the resulting possibilities for the sequence of rooms in which
Beauty is awoken, and their probabilities.
I take it to be clear (though see Footnote 5) that, upon awakening in the
white room, Beauty should place 1/3 credence in each of the centered worlds
WG/Monday, WO/Monday, and BO/Tuesday. Specifically, I take it that both
halfers and thirders will agree on this, because in each of the three possible
worlds that have not been ruled out, there is only one awakening (out of two)
in the white room. Similarly, upon awakening in the black room, Beauty should
place 1/3 credence in each of BG/Monday, BO/Monday, and WO/Tuesday.
Note the total symmetry between black and white in this example, which will
be essential to my argument.
In fact, the WBG variant is arguably isomorphic to Technicolor Beauty [Titelbaum,
2008]. In Technicolor Beauty, the setup is the same as in the original variant
of the Sleeping Beauty problem, except an additional coin is tossed. If it comes
up one way, Beauty sees a red piece of paper on Monday and (if she wakes up
on Tuesday at all) a blue piece of paper on Tuesday; otherwise, the order in
which she sees the colored pieces of paper is reversed. This Technicolor coin
corresponds to the White / Black coin in our WBG variant, and the original
Sleeping Beauty coin corresponds to the Grey / Opposite coin. Staying asleep
on Tuesday corresponds to the grey room in the WBG variant. I will stick with
the WBG variant here, in part because I believe it brings out the symmetry
slightly better, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because it ensures that
Beauty always awakens twice. This latter property makes it difficult to imagine
that any credences other than those of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 described above could rea-
sonably be considered correct. If one agrees that the corresponding credences
are also correct for both halfers and thirders in Technicolor Beauty,5 then all
5A standard interpretation of how the halfer assigns credences in general (e.g., Halpern
[2006], Meacham [2008], Briggs [2010]) would indeed, in the Technicolor Beauty variant, assign
credences of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 in the possible worlds HR, TR, TB upon seeing a red piece of paper
(where the first letter indicates the outcome of the original coin toss and the second letter the
color seen on Monday), as these are the possible worlds that are not ruled out by the evidence.
This, surprisingly, results in a credence of 1/3 in Heads for the halfer. However, Pittard [2015]
has objected to this conclusion and suggested that another interpretation of halfing should be
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that follows can also be put in terms of that variant. We are now ready to
introduce the Dutch book.
3 A Dutch Book for the WBG Sleeping Beauty
Variant
Beauty will be offered the following bets.
• Bet 1. This bet will be offered once, right before the experiment. It costs
20 and pays out 42 if coin 2 comes up Grey.
• Bet 2. This bet will be offered once each time that Beauty awakens in
the white or the black room, but never in the grey room. Thus, it will
be offered once overall if coin 2 comes up Grey, but twice overall if coin
2 comes up Opposite. It costs 24 and pays out 33 if coin 2 comes up
Opposite.
It should be noted that these bets are legitimate in the sense that the bookie
is not exploiting any information that Beauty does not have available to her. I
will revisit this point in Subsection 4.3 below.
found that keeps the credence in Heads at 1/2 in Technicolor Beauty. One interpretation of
halfing that would achieve this is to treat Beauty’s awakening as selected uniformly at random
from her awakenings in the experiment in the actual world. Under this interpretation, we
would have P (see red|HR) = 1 (because HR has only one awakening) but P (see red|TR) =
P (see red|TB) = 1/2 (because in each of TR and TB, only one of two awakenings results in
seeing red). Hence, by Bayes’ rule,
P (HR|see red) =
P (see red|HR)P (HR)
P (see red|HR)P (HR) + P (see red|TR)P (TR) + P (see red|TB)P (TB)
=
1 · (1/4)
1 · (1/4) + (1/2) · (1/4) + (1/2) · (1/4)
= 1/2
as desired by Pittard. In contrast, if we apply this interpretation of halfing to the WBG
variant, we still obtain
P (WG|see white) =
P (see white|WG)P (WG)
P (see white|WG)P (WG) + P (see white|WO)P (WO) + P (see white|BO)P (BO)
=
(1/2) · (1/4)
(1/2) · (1/4) + (1/2) · (1/4) + (1/2) · (1/4)
= 1/3
as desired for the Dutch book presented in this paper. The key difference from Technicolor
Beauty is that P (see white|WG) = 1/2 because there is also an awakening in the grey room.
Of course, the standard interpretation of halfing also results in credences of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 in
the WBG variant. The point of discussing this other interpretation of halfing here is not to
argue for it, but rather merely to show that while interpretations of halfing may disagree about
the correct credences in Technicolor Beauty, it is hard to imagine that they would disagree in
the WBG variant. One possible approach to finding an interpretation that disagrees is to take
Bostrom’s approach of classifying awakenings into “reference classes” [Bostrom, 2002, 2007]
and argue that the awakenings in the white and black rooms belong to the same reference
class, but not those in the grey room, thereby eliminating the grey room from the picture in
the calculation above. However, it seems hard to justify this classification without reference
to the particular details of the bets offered, and it seems difficult to swallow that credences
should depend on these details.
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WG (1/4) WO (1/4) BO (1/4) BG (1/4)
Sunday bet 1: 22 bet 1: -20 bet 1: -20 bet 1: 22
Monday bet 2: -24 bet 2: 9 bet 2: 9 bet 2: -24
Tuesday no bet bet 2: 9 bet 2: 9 no bet
total gain from accepting all bets -2 -2 -2 -2
Figure 4: The table shows which bet is offered when, as well as the net gain
from accepting the bet in the corresponding possible world, for the Dutch book
presented in this paper.
First, let us verify that accepting all these bets is sure to result in a loss.
If coin 2 comes up Grey, then bet 2 is offered only once, so that Beauty pays
20 + 24 = 44, and receives a payout of 42 from bet 1 – so she runs a loss of 2.
On the other hand, if coin 2 comes up Opposite, then bet 2 is offered twice, so
that Beauty pays 20+ 2 · 24 = 68, and receives a payout of 2 · 33 = 66 from the
two iterations of bet 2 – so again she runs a loss of 2. The table in Figure 4
summarizes the Dutch book.
But who will actually accept these bets? Both causal and evidential decision
theorists will accept bet 1, because before the experiment there is a 50% chance
that coin 2 comes up Grey, so that the expected payout from bet 1 is 21, which
is greater than 20. Will a causal decision theorist accept bet 2? No: given that
the room is (say) white, she believes that there is a probability of 2/3 that coin
2 has come up Opposite, so the expected payout of the bet is (2/3) · 33 = 22,
which is less than the cost of the bet, 24. So the causal decision theorist is not
vulnerable to this Dutch book.
All that remains to show is that the evidential decision theorist will accept
bet 2 whenever it is offered to her. Here, then, is the crux of the argument.
Suppose the room is white. Then, accepting the bet is strong evidence that
she also would also accept the bet in the black room. After all, the situation
(including the bets) is entirely symmetric between white and black, so it is
hard to see why Beauty would accept the bet in the white room but not in the
black room. Similarly, not accepting the bet is strong evidence that she would
also not accept it in the black room. Now, her credence is 2/3 that coin 2 has
come up Opposite, in which case she either will be, or has been, confronted
with the black room. Accepting the bet now (in the white room) leads her
to believe that she accepts on both days in this case, which costs 48 and pays
off 66, for a gain of 18; not accepting the bet leads her to believe that she
does not accept it on either day. On the other hand, her credence is 1/3 that
coin 2 has come up Grey, in which case it must now be Monday and no bet
will be offered tomorrow. In this case, accepting the bet costs 24 and pays off
nothing, for a loss of 24. Thus, in expectation, the gain from accepting the bet
is (2/3) ·18− (1/3) ·24 = 12− 8 = 4 > 0. So she will accept the bet in the white
room! Of course, by the symmetry between white and black, this means that
she will also accept the bet in the black room. Hence, the evidential decision
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theorist falls for the Dutch book.
Some intuition for what makes this Dutch book work is as follows. From
the perspective of maximizing expected net gain, clearly bet 1 is a good one to
accept, resulting in an ex ante expected net gain of (2/4) · 22− (2/4) · 20 = 1.
This suggests that the evidential decision theorist’s mistake is in accepting bet 2.
Always accepting bet 2 results in an ex ante expected net loss of (2/4)·24−(2/4)·
18 = 3. So what makes the evidential decision theorist accept this bet? Suppose
she is in a white room. She will reason that if she accepts, then she would also
accept in a black room. There are three possible worlds where she is in a black
room at some point: WO, BO, and BG. But BG is ruled out by the evidence of
currently being in a white room and therefore does not factor into her current
expected payoff calculation. Moreover, this is precisely the one world where
accepting the bet in a black room comes at a cost! Therefore, she evaluates the
quality of the bet based on a biased selection of the centered worlds in a black
room, making the bet look better than it is. The causal decision theorist, on
the other hand, ignores bets in black rooms altogether when making a decision
in a white room, and thereby avoids being affected by this selection bias.
4 Discussion
What has gone wrong for the evidential decision theorist, particularly the evi-
dential decision theorist who is a halfer and is hence supposed to be immune to
Dutch books according to Briggs [2010]? In this section, I first discuss the key
technical problem with attempting to apply Briggs’ proof in the context of the
WBG variant. As noted earlier, a key issue is the possibility that knowledge
of a decision in one information state affects beliefs about decisions in a differ-
ent information state. One way around the Dutch book, therefore, is to deny
the possibility of beliefs being affected in this way. I continue by arguing that
this escape route is unreasonable. I conclude this section by discussing to what
extent susceptibility to the Dutch book indicates irrationality.
4.1 The problem with attempting to apply Briggs’ proof
Why does Briggs’ proof of the invulnerability to Dutch books of evidential
decision theorists who are halfers not apply here? To appreciate this, it will
be helpful to first discuss some essential features of her proof. As noted earlier,
it implicitly assumes that the information that Beauty has available to her
upon awakening during the experiment is always the same. Briggs uses NW
to refer to the number of centers (awakening events within the experiment) in
possible (uncentered) world W . Suppose Beauty is considering a bet whose net
payout (including the initial cost of the bet) is XW in world W . If she is an
evidential decision theorist, she will reason that if she accepts (rejects) the bet
now, then she also accepts (rejects) it on all other occasions. She concludes that
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her net payout is NWXW if she accepts, and 0 if she rejects.
6 Of course she
does not necessarily know in which possible world she is, so she has to consider
the expected value. Letting Cru denote halfer credences, an evidential decision
theorist who is a halfer will accept the bet if
∑
W
Cru(W )NWXW > 0.
In contrast, a causal decision theorist deciding on the same bet will not let
the other NW − 1 bets that she is offered in world W affect her decision, so that
NWXW is replaced by XW in the above. However, if she is a thirder rather than
a halfer, then her credence in worldW will be proportional to Cru(W )NW rather
than Cru(W ). Hence, again, she accepts the bet if
∑
W
Cru(W )NWXW > 0,
the only difference being that the factor NW comes from the credence in this
case. Briggs proves that betting in this way (“betting at thirder odds”) leaves
Beauty immune to Dutch books.
All of this makes sense when Beauty always has the same information upon
awakening. When this is not the case, we should first enrich the notation a
bit. What is relevant is not the total number of centers NW in a world, but
rather the number of centers N I
W
consistent with the current information I.
For example, in the WBG variant, it does not suffice to know that NWG = 2;
rather, we need that NwhiteWG = 1, N
grey
WG = 1, and N
black
WG = 0. Then, one might
suppose that with information I, the credence in some world W (that is not
yet ruled out by I) is Cru(W ) for the halfer and proportional to Cru(W )N
I
W
for the thirder. (Note that this would be consistent with the credences in the
WBG variant.) The causal decision theorist who is a thirder would then accept
the bet if
∑
W
Cru(W )N
I
W
XW > 0. Now, what about the evidential decision
theorist who is a halfer? Suppose it were the case that now accepting (rejecting)
the bet with information I leads her to believe that she always accepts (rejects)
it with information I, but does not influence her beliefs about what she would do
given any other information.7 Then, in world W , she believes her net payout if
she rejects the bet is c (i.e., whatever she expects to get from any bets accepted
when she has information other than I), and her net payout if she accepts the
bet is N I
W
XW + c. The c term cancels out, and hence, again, she will accept
the bet if
∑
W
Cru(W )N
I
W
XW > 0. So the argument would appear to carry
through. The problem is that, as I have argued (and will argue further in
Subsection 4.2), it is unreasonable to suppose that the decision made with the
current information does not affect beliefs about decisions made with slightly
different information! If it does affect them, then the equivalence argument falls
apart: we can no longer cancel out the c term in the above because it now
depends on the decision made with information I, and as a result the condition
for accepting a bet changes in the case of the evidential decision theorist who is
a halfer. This is what allows the Dutch book for the WBG variant. (It is worth
emphasizing again that in the WBG variant, the credences of 1/3 placed in each
of the remaining possible worlds do not seem in question, suggesting that the
6This assumes that she will be offered the same bet upon each awakening, but this is a
reasonable requirement: see Subsection 4.3.
7Again, note that she should always be offered the same bet whenever she has information
I; otherwise, the bet offered would in fact give her additional information. See Subsection 4.3
for further discussion.
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problem in fact lies with evidential decision theory, not with halfing – at least
as far as this particular Dutch book is concerned.)
Thus, a causal decision theorist who is a thirder might analyze the eviden-
tial decision theorist’s susceptibility to the Dutch book as follows. When an
evidential decision theorist considers the payoff she expects to get from a given
action in some centered world C, what happens is that, for each possible world
W with multiple centers that are like C, she counts the effects of the action
multiple times in W . This is a mistake. On the other hand, when a halfer in
centered world C assesses the probability of a possible world W that contains
multiple centers that are indistinguishable from C, she fails to give probability
to W that is proportional to the number of such centers in W . This, too, is a
mistake. However, the two mistakes happen to cancel each other out exactly, if
the only centers that are like C are the centers that are indistinguishable from
C. Typical Sleeping Beauty variants have this feature, giving rise to the idea
that halfers who adopt evidential decision theory avoid Dutch books. However,
it is possible for two centered worlds to be alike while simultaneously being dis-
tinguishable. This is what is happening in the WBG variant – white centered
worlds and black centered worlds are alike but distinguishable. Because of this,
the mistake in assessing actions’ payoffs is still made, but it is not canceled out
because no mistake is made in assessing the probabilities of possible worlds.
4.2 Avoiding the Dutch book by not changing beliefs in
other information states
Based on the above, one strategy for the evidential decision theorist to avoid the
Dutch book is to never let decisions in one information state affect beliefs about
decisions in different information states. Suppose she takes this approach and
we vary the decision that she makes in the current centered world. As we do so,
her beliefs (conditional on this decision) about what she would do in centered
worlds that are indistinguishable from the current one will also vary, but her
beliefs about what she would do in other centered worlds (in particular, ones
that are alike but distinguishable) will not. This indeed avoids the Dutch book.
But this approach seems highly unappealing.
Of course, one could add details to the case to make this approach seem
more palatable. For example, we may suppose that before the experiment, a
neurological examination revealed to Beauty that the part of her brain that is
activated to make decisions in white rooms is entirely disjoint from the part
activated to make decisions in black rooms. With these (or perhaps alternative)
additional details, it can perhaps be successfully argued that her beliefs about
what she does in black rooms should not be affected by information about what
she does in white rooms. But this fails to get the evidential decision theorist out
of trouble. The Dutch book does not need to succeed no matter what details are
added to the case. For it to exhibit a problem with evidential decision theory,
all that is necessary is that is succeeds for some details. We may just as well
specify that the neurological examination reveals to Beauty that the part of her
brain involved in decision making is entirely uninfluenced by the color of the
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room. In that case, it seems entirely unreasonable for beliefs about black-room
decisions to be uninfluenced by knowledge of white-room decisions.
Moreover, even though this is in fact not necessary for the argument to
succeed, I would argue that when no details are added to the case – i.e., Beauty
does not have any additional relevant information, such as the results of a
neurological examination – by default, beliefs about black-room decisions should
be influenced by knowledge of white-room decisions as I have suggested. By way
of analogy, suppose we see Kim treating another person kindly, and this other
person happens to stand to her left. Clearly, this will increase our credence
that Kim would treat other people who stand to her left kindly. But it would
be preposterous to not also increase our credence that Kim would treat people
who stand to her right kindly, unless we have reason to believe that there is
a fundamental asymmetry between left and right (e.g., if we know Kim does
not hear well with her right ear and this causes her great frustration). The
situation is similar in our context: unless we have a particular reason to believe
that the color of the room is relevant to the decisions (as in the first example of
a neurological examination), the Dutch book goes through.8
4.3 Why susceptibility to (certain) Dutch books poses a
problem
Does susceptibility to diachronic Dutch books really indicate irrationality? This
question has been discussed at length in earlier work [Hitchcock, 2004, Briggs,
2010], and I do not have much to add that is new, but it is worth revisiting the
key points here. Some Dutch book arguments have been made that require the
bookie to have information that Beauty does not. For example, consider the
following Dutch book argument against a thirder, presented by Hitchcock [2004]
precisely in order to highlight this issue. On Sunday, Beauty is offered a bet that
pays out 30 on Heads, which costs 15. Then, on Monday, Beauty is offered a bet
that pays out 30 on Tails, which costs 20. The argument is that she is willing
to accept both bets – in particular, she is willing to accept the latter because
she at that point believes the probability of Tails is 2/3 – but accepting both
bets is sure to result in a loss of 5. The problem is that offering the second bet
requires the bookie to know something that Beauty does not, namely, that it is
Monday and not Tuesday. If he did not know this, he could end up selling the
second bet to her twice in the Tails world, which would cause the Dutch book to
fail.9 Now, susceptibility to being Dutch-booked by a bookie that has additional
information does not seem to indicate a failure of rationality. After all, consider
8One might also suppose that knowledge of her decision in a white room makes Beauty
only (say) 99% confident in what her decision would be in a black room, where the remaining
1% is intended to capture a small probability that the room color is somehow relevant to the
decision. It is easy to see that the Dutch book still goes through under these conditions.
9As already pointed out by Hitchcock, to be precise, what information the bookie has is
not exactly what is at issue. If the bookie does not know what day it is, but someone else
prevents the bookie from offering the second bet on Tuesday to make the Dutch book work,
this is just as problematic. The point is that the process as a whole by which bets are offered
to Beauty cannot use information that is unavailable to Beauty.
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W (1/4) WB (1/2) B (1/4)
Monday White awakens both awaken Black awakens
Figure 5: Possible worlds and their probabilities with two Beauties.
the extreme case where a deceptive bookie already knows the outcomes of the
bets in advance. In such a case it is not surprising that he can choose which bet
to offer to ensure himself a profit. (For a concrete example, see Briggs [2010].)
Another take on this is that if Beauty is astute, then the event of being offered a
bet in fact provides her with additional information, which she should take into
account when deciding whether to accept. If our thirder Beauty above knows
that the second bet is only offered to her on Mondays, then upon being offered
the bet she will know it is Monday, update her credence in Tails to 1/2, and not
take the bet.
However, like Hitchcock’s Dutch book, the Dutch book presented in this
paper does not require the bookie to have superior information. It is sufficient
for the bookie to know what Beauty knows (i.e., the color of the room) in order
to decide which bet to offer her. In Hitchcock’s words, he can “sleep with her” –
that is, be put to sleep and awoken and have his memory impaired in exactly the
same manner. As a result, being offered a bet can never provide Beauty with
additional information. This remains true even if she is told the bookie’s entire
betting strategy at the outset. This is perhaps what most strongly suggests that
susceptibility to such a Dutch book indicates a degree of irrationality: even if
Beauty is completely aware of the game the bookie is playing with her, she still
falls for the sure loss.
5 Concluding Remarks
The evidential decision theorist may hope that the type of Dutch book presented
here is inherently restricted to scenarios where the agent’s memory is impaired.
But I believe that the problem runs at least a bit deeper than that. For example,
we can easily modify the WBG variant so that there are now two Beauties,
one (“White”) who is awoken whenever the original Beauty was awoken in the
white room, and one (“Black”) who is awoken whenever the original Beauty
was awoken in the black room. These Beauties can be awoken simultaneously
(in separate rooms) rather than sequentially, thereby combining the WO and
BO worlds into a single WB world. The table in Figure 5 summarizes this
variant. We can then let the two Beauties bet under a joint account whose
value they are both trying to maximize, and, if they are evidential decision
theorists, they will fall prey to the same Dutch book, even without memory
impairment (assuming no communication between them). The table in Figure 6
summarizes the Dutch book. For the purpose of symmetry, we split bet 1 into
two halves, each denoted 1’, one for White and one for Black, with half the
cost and half the payout each. Note that in this context, my interpretation
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W (1/4) WB (1/2) B (1/4)
Sunday bet 1’ (W): 11 bet 1’ (W): -10 bet 1’ (W): 11
bet 1’ (B): 11 bet 1’ (B): -10 bet 1’ (B): 11
Monday bet 2 (W): -24 bet 2 (W): 9 (no bet for W)
(no bet for B) bet 2 (B): 9 bet 2 (B): -24
total gain from accepting all bets -2 -2 -2
Figure 6: The table shows which bet is offered when and (in parentheses) to
whom, as well as the net gain from accepting the bet in the corresponding
possible world, for the Dutch book adapted to the two-Beauties variant.
of evidential decision theory comes down to requiring that each Beauty, when
calculating her expected utility from accepting a bet (or declining it), assumes
in this calculation that the other Beauty would do the same – so we should
assume that the Beauties are psychological twins.10 Specifically, when offered
bet 2, White places credence 2/3 in the world WB, and when calculating the
value of accepting bet 2 in this world assumes that Black will accept too, for a
total gain of 2 · 9 = 18; she places credence 1/3 in the world W, where Black
will not get to act, so that the loss from accepting the bet is only 24. Because
(once again) (2/3) · 18 − (1/3) · 24 = 12 − 8 = 4 > 0, she accepts the bet (and
Black will do so as well, by symmetry).
Does the fact that the two Beauties together are susceptible to a Dutch
book indicate that they are irrational? This is certainly not as well established
as it is for the case of a Dutch book for a single agent (as summarized in
Subsection 4.3), and some skepticism is in order. For example, it is well known in
game theory that rational behavior by multiple agents can result in an outcome
that is strongly Pareto dominated, i.e., there exists another outcome that all
agents would strictly prefer. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the standard example.
However, such examples rely on the agents having different preferences. In
contrast, the two Beauties above have the exact same preferences. Also, it
seems that the key properties that make a Dutch book convincing, as discussed
in Subsection 4.3, still hold here. It is true that the bookie will have more
information than either single Beauty alone. However, this is easily fixed by
stipulating that there are two bookies, also with a joint account, each of whom
is assigned to sleep with and offer bets to one of the Beauties. Then, again, being
offered a bet does not provide either Beauty with more information, and this
remains true even if the bookies’ joint betting strategy is common knowledge
at the outset.
It appears, then, that the Dutch book argument presented in this paper
deals a serious blow to evidential decision theory. Of course, evidential decision
theory is often applied in settings where a decision provides evidence not about
past or future decisions that are similar, or about decisions by another similar
10Variants of the Sleeping Beauty problem with clones are fairly common – see, e.g., Elga
[2004] and Schwarz [2014a].
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agent, but rather about something relevant in the environment – various types
of brain lesion, a demon’s decision, etc. It does not appear that this Dutch
book argument can be applied in such cases, so perhaps the evidential decision
theorist can retreat to an appropriately restricted version of the theory (though
it is not immediately clear whether and how this can be coherently done). Even
upon such retreat, I believe the glancing blow to what remains of the theory
should be cause for concern for anyone sympathetic to it.
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